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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No.
15432

KARL J. STAVAR,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, the State of Utah, appeals from an
order of the District Court granting respondent's motion to
dismiss an action to remove respondent from public office
for malfeasance in office.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent's motion to dismiss the action for
removal from public office was granted as a matter of law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the order of dismissal
and remand to the District Court for a trial on the merits of
the accusation of malfeasance in office.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Utah Attorney General accused Karl J. Stavar,
the appointed Chief of Police of Helper, Utah, of Malfeasance
in Officer under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953), as amended

r

in that:
". • • during his term as Chief of
Police said defendant did intentionally
and knowingly breach the trust imposed upon
him by virtue of his office to a substantial
degree and in such way as to offend against
the commonly accepted standards of a person
in his office."
(R. l)
Defendant moved to dismiss the accusation arguing
that he had not been convicted of any of the offenses
enumerated in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (1953), as amended, and
that only after a conviction on one of the aforementioned
offenses can an action for removal be maintained under Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-2

(1953), as amended.

After a hearing, the motion to dismiss was granted
without prejudice for the following reasons:
"l. That under § 77-7-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a
conviction must precede the initiation
of any action under § 77-7-2, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended; and
2. That the accusation on file
herein does not state facts with
sufficient particularity to state a
cause of action."
(R.11)
The State of Utah appeals to the Utah Supreme court i
I

from that dismissal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME IS NOT A PREREQUISITE
TO INITIATION OF AN ACTION TO REMOVE A PUBLIC
OFFICIAL, ESPECIALLY WHEN REMOVAL IS BASED UPON
MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE.
One of the most fundamental and basic principles
of statutory construction is that if at all possible,
statutes must be construed to give meaning to all relevant
sections, to all paragraphs, to all sentences, and to all
words.
An equally basic corrollary rule of statutory
construction requires that statutes be considered as a whole
in context with all other relevant statutes in order to
derive meaning consistent with all.
In Totorien v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d
984 (1965), this Court was concerned with the interpretation
of a statute on liens against property.

The Court stated:

"It needs no citation of
authorities that whenever possible
effect should be given to every
part of an Act." Id. at 178.
(Emphasis added.)
In Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100,
485 P.2d 1035 (1971), the Court considered a statute involved
intricately with basic constitutionally protected rights--the
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forfeiture of a person's land for default in payments to the
State.

This Court held that each term of a statute must

be given meaning:
"Foundational rules require that
we assume that each term of a statute
was used advisedly • • • • " Id. at
102.
(Emphasis added.)
The above stated principles apply not only in
civil cases but also in criminal.
In State v. Gates, 118 Utah 182, 221 P.2d 878
(1950), this Court considered the interpretation of a crimina'.
statute making it a felony to pander, that is, to "induce,
persuade, encourage • • • a female person to become a
I

prostitute."

Id. at 184.

The Court declared the principles

to be of the most basic in statutory construction:
" • • [o]ne of the axiomatic
rules of construction that every
law, if possible, should be construed
as-to give effect to all of its
provisions." Id. at 188.
(Emphasis
added.)
State v. Jester, 448 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1968), is exemplary of
more recent application of the principles to criminal law.
Many of the very recent cases concerning the
principles simply refer to the older cases such as those
cited above.

Because this Court recognizes the principles

as "axiomatic" and needing "no citation of authorities,"
appellant will not belabor the point by citing other of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
myriad
of Library
cases
applicable.
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I

The District Court's holding flies directly in
the face of the above mentioned fundamentals of statutory
construction, and renders several important, related
statutes totally meaningless.
For example, the lower court's holding renders
the words "malfeasance in office" in Utah Code Ann.

§

77-7-1 (1953), as amended (hereinafter 77-7-1),totally
void, and assumes that the legislature's present use of
those words is inadvised, useless, and without any effect.
The lower court position is that action to remove a public
official under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953), as amended
(hereinafter 77-7-2) must be preceded by a conviction for
one of the matters stated in 77-7-1.
77-7-2 states:
"An action for the removal of
any officer of a city, county, or
other political subdivision of this
state on grounds set forth in section
77-7-1, may be commenced by presenting
a sworn, written accusation to the
district court. Such accusation may be
initiated by any taxpayer, grand jury,
or county attorney for the county in
which the officer was elected or appointed,
or by the attorney general."

-5-
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77-7-1 states:
"All officers of any city,
county or other political subdivision of this state not liable
to impeachment shall be subject
to removal as provided in this
chapter upon being convicted of a
felony, an indictable misdemeanor,
a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude or malfeasance in office."
If the lower court is correct, then the words
"malfeasance in office" have no meaning whatsoever; there
is no crime of malfeasance in office, so a conviction
therefor is impossible.

Defendant himself admitted, during

argument before_ the District Court, that there is no crime
of malfeasance and that those words "malfeasance in office"
apparently have no meaning or effect.

(Unfortunately, the

District Court did not make record of the arguments and
statements of counsel.)

Clearly the District Court has

disregarded the "axiomatic" principles stated above.
Not only are the words "malfeasance in office"
left without meaning, but all of Utah'Code Ann.

§

77-7-16

(1953), as amended (hereafter 77-7-16) is also rendered
void or absurd by the court's interpretation.
states:

-6-
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77-7-16

"Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to prevent the
officers mentioned from being
proceeded against by information
or indictment for a public offense
in the same manner as is provided
by law for so proceeding against
other persons accused of a public
offense."
If a conviction for the offense must necessarily precede
an action,as respondent asserts, then 77-7-16 would mean:
even though one has obtained a conviction against a public
official for an offense, and uses that conviction as a ground
for removal, one can still proceed by indictment or information to get another conviction on the same offense.
absurd.

That is

If a conviction is necessary to initiate action to

remove, then there is no need for a statute to allow the
filing of indictments or informqtions concerning the same
matter.

The reading of all of the relevant sections together

in order to give meaning to all, logically and inescapably
requires an interpretation other than that of the lower court.
Not only are the words "malfeasance in off ice" and
all of Section 77-7-16 rendered meaningless, but other
extremely important legislative words are totally emasculated
by the position of the respondent in the lower court.

77-7-2

provides for the initiation of removal proceeding by a taxpayer
in addition to proceedings by county attorneys, the attorney
general, etc.

Appellant submits that the legislature allowed
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taxpayer actions for removal as a check in the event that
the public prosecuting officials, county attorneys and
the attorney general, fail to do their duty because they are
corrupt or otherwise.

However, if the initiation of an actio:

for removal must be preceded by a prosecution and conviction I
for a crime, then the taxpayer can do nothing if the prosecut
fail to do their duty and refuse to prosecute.

The taxpayer

I

check on prosecuting officials becomes a completely illusory
remedy, for the taxpayer cannot initiate and prosecute crimes,
Not only are the words "malfeasance in office,• all
of section 77-7-16, and the right of a taxpayer to initiate

I

action rendered meaningless, but all of Utah Code Ann. §
77-7-4 (1953), as amended (hereafter 77-7-4), becomes absurd,]
77-7-4 provides that the grounds for an accusation for removi!i
can be found by a grand jury and presented to the county
attorney.

If a conviction for a crime is the only ground

for removal, as the lower court held, then the grand jury
contemplated by 77-7-4 would be convened and would take
evidence on the sole issue of whether or not the convicted
public official has been convicted.

That a grand jury would

have to be convened to deliberate on and determine whether tl'
convicted official has been convicted approaches the r1· d1'culo
Contrary to the lower court's holding, 77-7-4 gives the

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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impression that a grand jury may be called to look into the
grounds for removal, that is, the possible commission (not
conviction) of a crime, or the commission of malfeasance in
office.

Grand jury initiation of removal proceedings are

also mentioned in 77-7-2.
Not only are the words "malfeasance in office,"
all of section 77-7-16, the right of a taxpayer to check
public officials, and the grand jury action to bring an
accusation rendered meaningless, but the lower court's
interpretation is in dissonance with the tone and tenor of
the entire Chapter 7 of Title 77.

The whole chapter provides

an orderly mechanism for the removal of office.
seq. provides for appearance of the accused.

77-7-1, et

He may answer

by denying the sufficiency of the accusation, any article
therein or the truth of the accusation.
77-7-6 and 77-7-7 (1953), as amended.
be entered.

Utah Code Ann.

§§

A plea of guilty may

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-10 (1953), as amended.

If

a plea of guilty is not entered a jury trial must be provided
and trial proceed as with an indictment or information.
Code Ann.

§

77-7-11 (1953), as amended.

Utah

The parties have the

right to compulsory attendance of witnesses on their behalf.
Utah Code Ann.

§

77-7-12 (1953), as amended.

"Upon a conviction"

the court will pronounce judgment and enter an order removing
the defendant from office after entering the causes for removal.
Utah Code
Ann.
77-7-13
(1953),
amended.
Sponsored
by the S.J.§Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitizationas
provided
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Chapter gives the impression of a complete
procedure for trial on the substance of charges against
an official, and not the introduction of a certified copy
of conviction.

The holding of the lower court flies in the

face of the Chapter as a whole.

Because the lower court's holding is inconsistent,
the question becomes:

is there a proper interpretation

which does not assume that some words of the legislature
have no meaning_, which does not assume that entire sections
were used inadvisedly, which does give effect to every part
of the act, and which is consistent with the tenor and logic
of the entire Chapter?

Appellant submits that the answer

is yes, and that the following provides that interpretation:
1)

77-7-2 states that the grounds for removal

are those stated in 77-7-1.
2)

the grounds stated in 77-7-1 are a felony,

one of the mentioned misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office,
thus giving meaning to the words "Malfeasance in Office."
3) The "conviction"

mentioned in 77-7-1 is that

conviction provided for in Utah Code Ann.

§

77-7-13 (1953)'

as amended (hereafter 77-7-13), after the jury trial and
all of the safeguards provided in the whole of Chapter 7
of Title 77.

77-7-13 states:
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I

"Upon a conviction, the court
must, at such time as it may appoint,
pronounce judgment that the defendant
be removed from office; but to warrant
a removal a judgment must be entered
and the causes of removal must be
assigned therein."
(Emphasis added.)
4)
under 77-7-13,

Consistent with 77-7-1, only after a conviction
for a felony, one of the mentioned misdemeanors,

or malfeasance in office, may a judgment of removal be entered.
5)

If a prosecuting official refuses or fails to

do his duty, then a taxpayer can bring an action alleging
the commission of a felony, one of the stated misdemeanors,
or malfeasance in office.
6)

A grand jury may be convened and may take

evidence concerning the commission of a felony, one of the
stated misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office.

If the grand

jury finds sufficient evidence, an accusation may be presented.
7)

If an action under 77-7-2 is filed by a grand

jury, a taxpayer or a prosecutor alleging the commission of
a felony;

then, consistent with 77-7-16, the State may

still proceed by indictment or information, to get a criminal
conviction upon the same facts.

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The above interpretation lends consistent, logical
significance to all words and to all relevant sections of
the law.

I
Even if this Court somehow should determine that the :
word "conviction" in 77-7-1 requires a prior conviction in
order for removal on grounds of conunission of a crime, the
right to remove a public officer for malfeasance in offke
must be preserved.

At the very least the Court should

hold .Jthat the word "conviction" in 77-7-1 applies only to the
criminal matters stated therein, but not to malfeasance in
office; that the conunis~ion of m~lfea~ance in office is
a specific ground for removal which does not require an
impossible prior conviction therefor.

The words of the

legislature must not be declared a nullity.
This Court has long recognized the significance
and importance of an action for removal for malfeasance in
office.

In State v. Gertz, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12

(1961), this Court specifically considered 77-7-2 after
removal of a city conunissioner for malfeasance in office.
This Court specifically recognized the wise and important
legislative purpose in the use of the words "malfeasance
in office."

In speaking specifically about malfeasance,

the Court stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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'

"From a survey of the
chapter (77-7 UCA 1953) it
appears that the legislature
thought the interests of the
public in combating corruption
in public off ice require an
expeditious procedure for the
removal of public officers who
betray their trusts." Id. at 350.
(Emphasis added.)
The Court held that malfeasance in office was
not a criminal proceeding, but "quasi-criminal."

Id. at 350.

The Court recognized that malfeasance in office
was a specific ground for removal from office

under 77-7-2,

and defined malfeasance as follows:
"On the contrary, by usage
the phrase 'malfeasance in office'
has acquired a commonly understood
meaning:
It requires an iriteriticirial
act or omission relcitinq to the
duties of a pub1ic office, which ..
amounts to a: crime, or which TnvolVes
a substantial breach of the trust
imposed upon the official by the
nature of his office, and which
conduct is of such a: character as· 'to
offend against the comiliorily acc·epl::ed
standards of honesty and moralTty."
Id. at 348.(Emphasis added.)
Appellant submits that the legislature used the words
"malfeasance in office" for a specific wise purpose and
that to declare those words meaningless,as the lower court
has, would be not only improper according to principles of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

construction, but also against the public welfare.
If the prior interpretation of 77-7-1 et seq.
by appellant is somehow deemed improper, appellant submits
that at least the following would be consistent with the
public interest and principles of construction:
1)

77-7-2 states grounds for removal are those

stated in 77-7-1.
2)

The grounds_ stated in 77-7-1 are:

a conviction

I

for a felony or one of the stated misdemeanors or {the commis·I
sion of) malfeasance in office as defined by State v. Gertz,
supra.
3)

A taxpayer may bring an action for malfeasance

if prosecuting officials fail to act.
4)

A grand jury may look at allegations and

evidence of malfeasance in office.
5)

Consistent with 77-7-16, if an accusation for

removal on the grounds of malfeasance in office is brought,
prosecutors may also proceed by indictment or information
upon related facts.
Again, all sections are given meaning, nothing is
rendered a nullity, and the public policy of protection
against corruption is preserved.

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSATION FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR FAILING
TO SET FORTH FACTS WITH SUFFICIENT
PARTICULARITY TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
The lower court also granted defendant's Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that "the accusation on file
herein does not state facts with sufficient particularity
to state a cause of action."

(R.11).

77-7-2 provides that the accusatory pleading in
an action for removal is an "accusation:"
"An accusation is writing
against any district, county,
precinct or municipal officer • •

"

77-7-4 again talks in terms of an accusation:
"When found by the grand
jury, the accusation must be presented
by the foreman. • • • "
The accusation in the present"case-conforms in every respe~t
to the Utah statutory pleading requirements.

The most general

statute relevant to this issue is Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-1
(1953), as amended, which details necessary elements in
complaints before magistrates.

The last paragraph of

Section 77-11-1 reads as follows:
"However, in cases of public
offenses triable upon information,
indictment or accusation, the complaint,
the right to a bill of particulars, and
all proceedings and matters in relation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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thereto, shall conform to and be
governed by the provisions of the New
Chapters 21 and 23 of Title 77, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by
chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935."
(Emphasis added.)
Turning to Utah Code Ann.

§

77-21-8 (1953), as

amended (hereafter 77-21-8), made applicable to accusation
pleading through the above quoted section 77-11-1, the
offense may be charged in

~

or more of the following ways:

"(a) By using the name given
to the offense by the common law or
by a statute.
(b) By stating so much of the
definition of the offense, either in
terms of the common law or of the
statute defining the offense or. in
terms of substantially the same meaning,
as is sufficient to give the court and
the defendant notice of what offense is
intended to be charged." (Emphasis added. l
The accusation in the instant case need only conform
to subsection (a) or to subsection (b) of the above statute,
The accusation herein conforms to both subsection (al and
subsection (b).
The accusation was phrased in the following terms:
"COMES NOW the State of Utah
and by and through Robert R. Wallace,
Assistant Attorney General, pursuant
to Title 77, Chapter 7, Section 2,
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended,
accuses Karl J. Stavar, duly appointed
Chief of Police for the City of Helper,
County of Carbon, State of Utah, of

(
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

l

committing Malfeasance in Office,
in that during his term as Chief
of Police said defendant did
intentionally and knowingly breach
the trust imposed upon him by virtue
of his office to a substantial degree
and in such a way as to offend against
the commonly accepted standards of a
person in his office." (R. 1).
The accusation uses the "name of the offense"
in accordance with subsection (a) of 77-21-8.
point the law is satisfied.

At that

However, appellant also

included the definition in "terms of substantially the
same meaning" in accordance with subsection (b) of 77-21-8.
This definition in terms of substantially the same meaning
was taken almost word for word from the definition of
malfeasance used by this Court in State v. Gertz, supra at 13.
The court stated the following about that definition:
"It is our opinion that the
phrase is sufficiently definite to
enable people of ordinary intelligence
and understanding to know what conduct
is required or prohibited and that it
is, therefore, not so vague or uncertain
as to be invalid." Id. at 348.
However, if the defendant was unaware by the
face of the pleading of what he was accused, a very detailed
bill of particulars could have been provided.

The right

to a bill of particulars is specifically made applicable to
an accusation in 77-11-1 quoted above, and bills of par~iculars

are provided for in Utah Code Ann.

§§

77-21-6 and

Sponsored by the S.J.
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant offered to provide a bill of particulars
to the defense during arguments to the court.

The arguments

were not recorded, however, the record only states that
arguments were made (Tr.9).
CONCLUSION
A conviction for a crime is not the only grounds
for bringing an action to remove public officers.

Officers

may also be removed by following the detailed procedures of
Chapter 7 of Title 77 upon an accusation that the public
official has committed malfeasance in office.

To hold that

a conviction must precede a removal action violates axiomatic
principles of statutory construction, violates sound reason·
ing, and violates public policy to stop corruption in public
office.
The accusation on file conforms to two requirements
of the law concerning the specificity of accusations, when
either one of the two would have sufficed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
ROBERT R. WALLACE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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